2008-05-26, by John Ringland
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I have been thinking a lot about Naïve Realism lately. It is a profoundly important concept to understand if people wish to safe-guard both their individual and collective sanity.
It came to my notice that the Wikipedia article on Naïve Realism was only a few paragraphs long, not referenced, quite biased and VERY misleading. So I rewrote the article using many quotes from philosophical and scientific sources with full references to map out the progression of our understanding of what it is and how it applies to our lives, the world and everything that we experience.
The new article is posted below but it will keep evolving (wikipedia version).
Naïve realism
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
Also see Realism.
Naïve realism is a common
sense theory
of perception.
Most people, until they start reflecting philosophically,
are naïve realists. This theory is also known as "direct
realism" or "common sense realism" [1]
.
Naïve realism claims that the world
is pretty much as common sense would have it. All objects
are composed of matter,
they occupy space,
and have properties such as size, shape, texture, smell, taste and
colour. These properties are usually perceived
correctly. So, when we look at and touch things we see and feel
those things directly, and so perceive them as they really
are. Objects continue to obey the laws of physics
and retain all their properties whether or not there is anyone
present to observe them doing so.[2]
It has been characterised as the unquestioned acceptance of the
following 5 beliefs.
1. There exists a world of material
objects. 2. Statements about these objects can be known to be
true through sense-experience. 3. These objects exist not
only when they are being perceived but also when they are not
perceived. The objects of perception are largely, we might want to
say, perception-independent.
4. These objects are also able to retain properties of the
types we perceive them as having, even when they are not being
perceived. Their properties are perception-independent. 5. By
means of our senses, we perceive the world directly, and pretty much
as it is. In the main, our claims to have knowledge
of it are justified. [3]
The debate over the nature of conscious
experience is
confounded by the deeper epistemological
question of whether the world we see around us is the real world
itself, or merely an internal perceptual copy of that world
generated by neural
processes in our brain.
In other words this is the question of direct realism, also known as
naive realism, as opposed to indirect realism, or
representationalism.[4]
Representationalism
is the philosophical
position that the world we see in conscious experience is not the
real world itself, but merely a miniature virtual-reality
replica of that world in an internal representation.
Representationalism is also known (in psychology)
as Indirect Perception, and (in philosophy)
as Indirect Realism, or Epistemological Dualism.[5]
Naïve realism is distinct from scientific
realism. Scientific realism says the universe
really contains just those properties which feature in a scientific
description of it, and so does not contain properties like colour
per se, but merely objects that reflect certain wavelengths
owing to their microscopic surface texture. The naïve realist,
on the other hand, would say that objects really do possess the
colours we perceive them to have. An example of a scientific realist
is John Locke,
who held the world only contains the primary
qualities that feature in a corpuscularian scientific account of
the world (see corpuscular
theory), and that other properties were entirely subjectivity,
depending for their existence
upon some perceiver who can observe the objects.[6]
Of all the branches of human knowledge, philosophy
might be expected to be the best inoculated against the naïve
realist error, since the issue of the epistemology
of conscious experience is a central focus of philosophy. However
modern philosophy is just as rife with naïve realists as are
modern psychology
and neuroscience.
As in psychology there is a recurring pattern of the occasional
visionary who points out the fallacy of the naïve view,
interspersed with long periods of enthusiastic support for the
latest naïve inspired view, although again the issue is
generally not addressed directly but only peripherally, as it is
hidden in the details of various theories.[7]
Arguments for and Against Naive Realism
Although this issue is not much discussed in
contemporary psychology, it is an old debate that has resurfaced
several times, but the continued failure to reach consensus on this
issue continues to bedevil the debate on the functional role of
conscious experience. The reason for the continued confusion is that
both direct and indirect realism are frankly incredible, although
each is incredible for different reasons.[8]
Problems with Direct Realism: The direct realist
view (Gibson 1972) is incredible because it suggests that we can
have experience of objects out in the world directly, beyond the
sensory surface, as if bypassing the chain of sensory processing.
For example if light from this paper is transduced by your retina
into a neural signal which is transmitted from your eye to your
brain, then the very first aspect of the paper that you can possibly
experience is the information at the retinal surface, or the
perceptual representation that it stimulates in your brain. The
physical paper itself lies beyond the sensory surface and therefore
must be beyond your direct experience. But the perceptual experience
of the page stubbornly appears out in the world itself instead of in
your brain, in apparent violation of everything we know about the
causal chain of vision. The difficulty with the concept of direct
perception is most clearly seen when considering how an artificial
vision system could be endowed with such external perception.
Although a sensor may record an external quantity in an internal
register or variable in a computer, from the internal perspective of
the software running on that computer, only the internal value of
that variable can be "seen", or can possibly influence the
operation of that software. In exactly analogous manner the pattern
of electrochemical activity that corresponds to our conscious
experience can take a form that reflects the properties of external
objects, but our consciousness is necessarily confined to the
experience of those internal effigies of external objects, rather
than of external objects themselves. Unless the principle of direct
perception can be demonstrated in a simple artificial sensory
system, this explanation remains as mysterious as the property of
consciousness it is supposed to explain.[9]
Problems with Indirect Realism: The indirect
realist view is also incredible, for it suggests that the solid
stable structure of the world that we perceive to surround us is
merely a pattern of energy in the physical brain, i.e. that the
world that appears to be external to our head is actually inside our
head. This could only mean that the head we have come to know as our
own is not our true physical head, but is merely a miniature
perceptual copy of our head inside a perceptual copy of the world,
all of which is completely contained within our true physical skull.
Stated from the internal phenomenal perspective, out beyond the
farthest things you can perceive in all directions, i.e. above the
dome of the sky and below the earth under your feet, or beyond the
walls, floor, and ceiling of the room you perceive around you,
beyond those perceived surfaces is the inner surface of your true
physical skull encompassing all that you perceive, and beyond that
skull is an unimaginably immense external world, of which the world
you see around you is merely a miniature virtual-reality replica.
The external world and its phenomenal replica cannot be spatially
superimposed, for one is inside your physical head, and the other is
outside. Therefore the vivid spatial structure of this page that you
perceive here in your hands is itself a pattern of activation within
your physical brain, and the real paper of which it is a copy it out
beyond your direct experience. Although this statement can only be
true in a topological, rather than a strict topographical sense,
this insight emphasizes the indisputable fact that no aspect of the
external world can possibly appear in consciousness except by being
represented explicitly in the brain. The existential vertigo
occasioned by this concept of perception is so disorienting that
only a handful of researchers have seriously entertained this notion
or pursued its implications to its logical conclusion. (Kant
1781/1991, Koffka 1935, Köhler 1971 p. 125, Russell 1927 pp
137-143, Smythies 1989, 1994, Harrison 1989, Hoffman 1998)[10]
The key to this problem of fitting a spacious world into
our brains is to notice that our experience is a 'view' of a
spacious world. Things are separated by angles relative to an
observation point. The separation of things by angles at a point
means that we do not have a sense of depth that operates in the same
way as our sense of things being separated in horizontal and
vertical directions. Our sense of depth is based upon cues rather
than an actual experience of the space between things. As an
example, the stars in a planetarium appear incredibly distant even
though they are on the ceiling of a room and would appear just as
distant if viewed through virtual reality goggles. Visual depth in
particular is a set of inferences, not an actual experience of the
space between things in a radial direction outward from the
observation point. This means that the things that are the spacious
world of experience could be as small as just a few cubic
millimetres of brain tissue![11]
If there is anything to be learned from the long history
of the epistemological debate, it is that the issue is by no means
simple or trivial, and that whatever is ultimately determined to be
the truth of epistemology, we can be sure that it will do
considerable violence to our common-sense view of things. This
however is nothing new in science, for many of the greatest
discoveries of science seemed initially to be so incredible that it
took decades or even centuries before they were generally accepted.
But accepted they were, eventually, and the reason why they were
accepted was not because they had become any less incredible. In
science, irrefutable evidence triumphs over incredibility, and this
is exactly what gives science the power to discover unexpected or
incredible truth. Ultimately, therefore, the most convincing
argument for epistemological dualism is the fact that its monistic
alternatives have all been refuted on sound logical grounds, which
leaves epistemological dualism as the only viable
alternative.[12](Naive
Realism in Contemporary Philosophy, see for a detailed account
of academic philosophical debate)
The Argument From Illusion
This argument was "first offered in a more or less fully
explicit form in Berkeley (1713)"[13].
It is also referred to as the problem of conflicting appearances
(e.g. Myles
Burnyeat's article Conflicting Appearances). The basic
outline of the argument goes as follows:
[W]e should remember that the following considerations
are also part of informed commonsense. A. What we perceive is
often dependent on our organs of perception and their condition. If
we had compound eyes, as flies do, we would receive information
about the visual world in a completely different form. If we had
jaundice, things would look yellow. If we had other sense organs
altogether, like infra-red detectors or echo-location devices,
things might appear to us in ways which we can’t even imagine.
(Let’s call this ‘perceptual variability’). B. Even our
current perceptual apparatus is obviously not infallible. We are all
familiar with perceptual illusions of various sorts. A major
sub-classification of such illusions relates to whether the sensory
organs are malfunctioning (as in jaundice) or whether they
habitually misrepresent objects to us even in full working order
(e.g. the Muller-Lyer illusion). (Call these phenomena ‘perceptual
illusions’). C. Sometimes these perceptual illusions extend
to cases where we think we perceive things which in fact aren’t
there at all (rather than just misperceiving the properties of
things which are there to be perceived). This is a more radical case
of perceptual error than simple illusion. (Call it ‘hallucination’
or ‘perceptual delusion’).[14]
The basic claim is that in cases of illusion or
hallucination, the object that is immediately experienced or given
has qualities that no public physical object in that situation has
and so must be distinct from any such object. And in cases of
perceptual relativity, since objects with different qualities are
experienced from each of the different perspectives or under each of
the relevant conditions, at most one of these various immediately
experienced or given objects could be the physical object itself; it
is then further argued that since there is no apparent experiential
basis for regarding one out of any such set of related perceptual
experiences as the one in which the relevant physical object is
itself immediately experienced, the most reasonable conclusion is
that the immediately experienced or given object is always distinct
from the physical object. (Or, significantly more weakly, that there
is no way to identify which, if any, of the immediately experienced
objects is the physical object itself, so that the evidential force
of the experience is in this respect the same in all cases, and it
is epistemologically as though physical objects were never given,
whether or not that is in fact the case.)[15]
The naive realist theory of perception is not threatened
by these facts [A,B & C] as they stand, for they are
accommodated by that theory by virtue its very vagueness (or
‘open-texture’). The theory just isn’t specific or detailed
enough to be refuted by the (actually very rare) occurrence of these
cases.[16]
The cogency of this argument has been challenged in a
number of different ways, of which the most important are the
following. First, it has been questioned whether there is any reason
to suppose that in cases of these kinds there must be some object
present that actually has the experienced qualities, which would
then seemingly have to be something like a sense-datum. Why couldn't
it be that the perceiver is simply in a state of seeming to
experience such an object without any object actually being present?
(See the discussion below of the adverbial theory.) Second, it has
been argued that in cases of illusion and perceptual relativity at
least, there is after all an object present, namely the relevant
physical object, which is simply misperceived, for the most part in
readily explainable ways. Why, it is asked, is there any need to
suppose that an additional object is also involved? Third, the last
part of the perceptual relativity version of the argument has been
challenged, both (i) by questioning whether it is really true that
there is no experiential difference between veridical and
non-veridical perception; and (ii) by arguing that even if
sense-data are experienced in non-veridical cases and even if the
difference between veridical and non-veridical cases is, as claimed,
experientially indiscernible, there is still no reason to think that
sense-data are the immediate objects of experience in veridical
cases. Fourth, various puzzling questions have been raised about the
nature of sense-data: Do they exist through time or are they
momentary? Can they exist when not being perceived? Are they public
or private? Can they be themselves misperceived? Do they exist in
minds or are they extra-mental, even if not physical? On the basis
of the intractability of these questions, it has been argued that
the conclusion of the argument from illusion is clearly unacceptable
or even ultimately unintelligible, even in the absence of a clear
diagnosis of exactly where and how it goes wrong.[17]
The Argument from the Scientific Account of
Perception
The main aspects of that account that are cited in this
connection are: (i) the fact that the character of the resulting
experience and of the physical object that it seems to present can
be altered in major ways by changes in the conditions of perception
or the condition of the relevant sense-organs and the resulting
neurophysiological processes, with no change in the external
physical object (if any) that initiates this process and that may
seem to be depicted by the experience that results; (ii) the related
fact that any process that terminates with the same sensory and
neural results will yield the same perceptual experience, no matter
what the physical object (if any) that initiated the process may
have been like; and (iii) the fact that the causal process that
intervenes between the external object and the perceptual experience
takes at least a small amount of time, so that the character of the
experience reflects (at most) an earlier stage of that object rather
than the one actually existing at that moment. In extreme cases, as
in observations of astronomical objects, the external object may
have ceased to exist long before the experience occurs. These facts
are claimed to point inexorably to the conclusion that the direct or
immediate object of such an experience, the object that is given, is
an entity produced at the end of this causal process and is thus
distinct from the physical object, if any, that initiates the
process.[18]
The Adverbial Theory of Naive Realism
In the above argument from the scientific account of
perception,
It is difficult to resist the conclusion that there is a
fundamental distinction between the external object, if any, that
initiates the perceptual process and the perceptual experience that
eventually results. This perceptual dualism thus raises inevitably
the the issue of how and even whether the object can be known on the
basis of the experience. What can and has been resisted, by the
adverbial theory in particular, is the idea that this dualism is a
dualism of objects, with perceptual experience being a more direct
experience of objects of a different sort, sense-data.[19]
Perceptual dualism implies,
both an act of awareness (or apprehension) and an object
(the sense-datum) which that act apprehends or is an awareness of.
The fundamental idea of the adverbial theory, in contrast, is that
there is no need for such objects and the problems that they bring
with them (such as whether they are physical or mental or somehow
neither). Instead, it is suggested, merely the occurrence of a
mental act or mental state with its own intrinsic character is
enough to account for the character of immediate experience.[20]
According to the adverbial theory, what happens when,
for example, I immediately experience a silver elliptical shape (as
when viewing a coin from an angle) is that I am in a certain
specific state of sensing or sensory awareness or of being appeared
to: I sense in a certain manner or am appeared to in a certain way,
and it is that specific manner of sensing or way of being appeared
to that accounts for the specific content of my immediate
experience... The essential point here is that when I sense or am
appeared to silver-elliptical-ly, there need be nothing more going
on than that I am in a certain distinctive sort of experiential
state. In particular, there need be no object or entity of any sort
that is literally silver and elliptical — not in the material
world, not in my mind, and not even in the realm (if there is such a
realm) of things that are neither physical nor mental.[21]
Sense-Datum and Adverbial Theories Compared
The sense-datum theory accounts more straightforwardly
for the character of immediate experience. I experience a silver and
elliptical shape because an object or entity that literally has that
color and shape is directly before my mind. But both the nature of
these entities and (as we will see further below) the way in which
they are related to the mind are difficult to understand.[22]
The adverbial theory, on the other hand, has the
advantage of being metaphysically simpler and of avoiding difficult
issues about the nature of sense-data. The problem with it is that
we seem to have no real understanding of the nature of the states in
question or of how exactly they account for the character of
immediate experience.[23]
Quantum Physics and Naive Realism
Scientific realism in classical (i.e. pre-quantum)
physics has remained compatible with the naive realism of everyday
thinking on the whole; whereas it has proven impossible to find any
consistent way to visualize the world underlying quantum theory in
terms of our pictures in the everyday world. The general conclusion
is that in quantum theory naive realism, although necessary at the
level of observations, fails at the microscopic level.[24]
[W]e have to give up the idea of [naive] realism to a
far greater extent than most physicists believe today." (Anton
Zeilinger)... By realism, he means the idea that objects have
specific features and properties — that a ball is red, that a book
contains the works of Shakespeare, or that an electron has a
particular spin... for objects governed by the laws of quantum
mechanics, like photons and electrons, it may make no sense to think
of them as having well defined characteristics. Instead, what we see
may depend on how we look." [25]
Quantum mechanics is increasingly applied to larger and
larger objects. Even a one-ton bar proposd to detect gravity waves
must be analysed quantum mechanically. In cosmology, a wavefunction
for the whole universe is written to study the Big Bang. It gets
harder today to nonchalantly accept the realm in which the quantum
rules apply as somehow not being physically real... "Quantum
mechanics forces us to abandon naive realism". And leave it at
that.[26]
Virtual Reality and Naive Realism
Also called virtual realism [27]
and is closely related to the adverbial theories of naive realism
discussed above.
In the research paper The reality of virtual reality it is
proposed that,
virtuality is itself a bonafide mode of reality, and
that "virtual reality" must be understood as "things,
agents and events that exist in cyberspace". These proposals
resolve the incoherences found in the ordinary uses of these
terms... "virtual reality", though based on recent
information technology, does not refer to mere technological
equipment or purely mental entities, or to some fake environment as
opposed to the real world, but that it is an ontological mode of
existence which leads to an expansion of our ordinary world[28]
The emergence of teleoperation and virtual environments
has greatly increased interest in "synthetic experience",
a mode of experience made possible by both these newer technologies
and earlier ones, such as telecommunication and sensory
prosthetics... understanding synthetic experience must begin by
recognizing the fallacy of naive realism and with the recognition
that the phenomenology of synthetic experience is continuous with
that of ordinary experience.[29]
Further Reading
Nelson, Quee, The Slightest Philosophy (Dog's Ear
Publishing, 2007), 276pp.
See also
External Links
Retrieved
from "http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Naïve_realism"
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