>Date: Mon, 6 Nov 95 11:18:11 PST
>From: djdaneh@pbhyc.PacBell.COM (Dan'l DanehyOakes)
>To: ssread-l@newciv.org
>Subject: Chapter 3 -- Part 1: General on Structure

Hi, y'all.

I specifically requested the privilege of "doing" Chapter Three because, since
first opening SCIENCE AND SANITY, I have been fascinated by the "idea" of a book
whose "Introduction" commences after a hundred pages of text (counting K.'s 
three Prefaces) .  And, indeed, we may, I "think," legitimately ask:  if Chapter
Three is the "Introduction," then what are the _structural_ functions of the 
first two?

Here, as (legitimate)everywhere, the unusual (and to a first-time reader, often
bizarre) structure of S&S makes itself explicitly perceived/felt/etc.

I structure my posting on Chapter Three in four parts.

First, this part, on structure.
Second, the summary proper of the "content" of Chapter Three.
Third, my own reactions/comments/etc. to the "content."
Fourth, some semantic comments -- this may be regarded as "nit picking"
	and I suggest that those with no patience for such *skip* this
	last part.

********************************************************************************

STRUCTURAL CONSIDERATIONS

Why, then, _does_ Korzybski place an "introduction" after two other chapters?

A glance at these three chapters gives the first glimpse of an answer.  It does
not suffice, I "think," to say that Chapter Three is the "Introduction." Rather,
the three chapters together, which Korzybski groups as "Part I: Preliminaries", 
perform, as a unit, _some_ of the functions which one might expect to be 
performed by the "introduction" of a conventionally (A-system) structured book. 
(They also perform other functions.)

At one level of abstraction, Part One follows a classical structure for an
Introduction:

Chapter One -- "Aims, Means, Etc." -- at this level of abstraction may be seen 
as setting forth the goals and principles of Korzybski's work-as-a-whole.

Chapter Two -- "Terminology and Meanings" -- at this level of abstraction may be
seen as serving, very much as its title "says," to introduce some of the 
technical terms to be used throughtout the work-as-a-whole.

Chapter Three -- "Introduction" -- at this level of abstraction may be seen as
completing the pattern, by setting forth the methodology of the work-as-a-whole.

Goals, principles, terminology, and methodology.  Viewed at this level, what 
could be more traditional, more _conventional_, for an "Introduction"?

And yet --

********************************************************************************

-- and yet, this remains only one level of abstraction.  A useful one, to be 
sure, and comforting for GS-novices desparately seeking some familiar structures
to grasp; and I should not be at all surprised if Count K, a deep structural 
thinker, when all's said and done, had this in "mind" in writing these chapters.

But this is not a privileged level of abstraction for viewing these chapters;
and, indeed, in some ways it proves out most unsatisfactory.  Turning briefly to
Chapter Two, for example, we find that the explanations of "terminology and
meanings" seem, really, quite unsatisfactory for a novice in GS; further, many
terms have been introduced -- often wiht far less explanation -- in the previous
chapter.  Korzybski uses words which have "common" meanings, or which we "think"
we would "understand" if we encountered them in ordinary conversation; but, in 
his usage, these words become unfamiliar, even intimidating; and he seems at
times _deliberately_ to avoid giving his bewildered first-time reader any clear
explanation of his "meanings" for these terms!

The same can be said for K's "explanations" of his goals, principles, and
methodology.  Looking closely, we see that they are not confined to the chapters
to which I have assigned them in the above schema, but in fact "slop over" to
the other chapters -- and to the rest of the book.

I "think" that this "is" a key factor in reading SCIENCE AND SANITY.  I suggest
that Korzybski has given us the clue to this "unortodox" structure by his 
insistence that S&S must be read more than once to be "understood" or for any
benefit to be gained.  I suggest that these chapters do not satisfactorily 
explain the goals, principles, terms, methodology, etc., of S&S, because *the
entire book, at one very important level of abstraction, serves as an
_extensional_ explanation of the goals, principles, and methodology, not only of
SCIENCE AND SANTIY, but of Korzybski's General Semantics(1933).

This suggestion seems to be confirmed by the books subtitle:  S&S is an
"Introduction to non-Aristotelean Systems and General Semantics."  Taking S&S 
as-a-whole, then, we may profitably view it as the introduction to a much larger
work.

In the Third Edition, we may see a list of present and future (1948) volumes in 
the "Non-Aristotelean Library."  One of the volumes listed as "in preparation" 
was to be titled, simply enough, "General Semantics," by A.  Korzybski.  It 
seems clear that this volume was never written; and I would go a step further 
and suggest that it never _could_ be written.

Sherlock Holmes remarks somewhere that, if the second chapter of a book finds 
us still in Chapter Two, then the first chapter must be "really intolerable."  
As for this hypothetical work that requires a 750+ page volume as its 
introduction -- 

Well -- 

********************************************************************************

-- well, yes, but what _about_ structure?  What about the structure of this
750-plus-page-Introduction, with a three chapter introduction of which the third
chapter is called "Introduction?"

I suggest that, rather amazingly, Korzybski anticipated by better than two
decades the whole-in-the-part structure to be found in holography, a structure
now being looked at as the most likely structure for the storage of "memory" in
the human nervous system; or, by even more "time," the analogous "holographic"
structure found in some postmodern "experimental" fiction.  On this level of 
abstraction, we may proitably read (legitimate)all of SCIENCE AND SANITY as an 
expansion or commentary upon any given chapter, but especially upon these three 
early chapters.  I know of no prior work of fiction or nonfiction that employs 
this structural device, and among contemporaries, the only work I know of is 
James Joyce's FINNEGANS WAKE, which, in 1933, was appearing in "chunks" in 
various magazines, under the unenlightening title "Work in Progress."

Viewed in this way, the reason for S'n'S's structure becomes much clearer to, at
any rate, _this_ reader.  A conventional work may have to explain a few
unfamiliar terms or unfamiliar senses of familiar terms to the reader, but it
explains them, usually intensionally, by explicit verbal (over/under)definition,
in terms of the reader's normal system, and, having defined these terms, this
conventional work can now proceed to serve its conventional purpose -- the
distribution to the reader of new data, facts, and/or theories.

S&S does (legitimate)none of these things.  Korzybski is not concerned with
offering new data, new facts; he is not even primarily concerned with offering
new theories.  Rather, he seeks to place (legitimate)all current(1933) facts,
data, theories, etc., into the context of a new(1933) _structure_, a system 
which re-casts the way in which the human "mind," "nervous system," etc.,
perceives facts, data, theories, etc., relates them to each other, etc.  In 
order to do this, Korzybski must teach the reader many new(1933) terms and
meanings of familiar terms; but to teach these terms in the conventional way, 
or even in the conventional way of teaching languages, will defeat his purpose,
for to do either of these things will allow the reader to incorporate the terms
into his/her existing (A-system) linguistic thinking in a "grammatically proper"
way, and thus, since words derive their "meaning" from structure, s/he will
learn them only _within_ the old system.  Korzybski seeks to help the reader
escape, or rather to transcend, that system.

The method Korzybski seems to have chosen resembles the "total immersion"
method of language teaching, and, even more, the way in which infants acquire
language.  The reader can acquire the "meaning" of the terms only in context, as
s/he acquires the structure-as-a-whole of the non-A system; at the same time,
s/he can acquire the structure-as-a-whole only by becoming familiar wiht the
terms.  An infant, learning its parents' language, also learns the ways in which
that language _structures perceived reality._  Adults, often including many 
highly-"intelligent" adults, often find the acquisition of new languages very
difficult for a number of reasons, but certainly one of the most important is
the difficulty which arises when the "structure of reality" of the new language
differs significantly from that of the "milk language."  Such highly-channelized
adults will probably also find themselves extremely challenged by the "new
system" of S&S.

(It would be an interesting experiment to poll GS-students and find out whether
there any significant negative correlation could be found between the number and
variety of languages spoken prior to studing GS, and the experienced/perceived 
difficulty of grasping the structure of the new system.)

********************************************************************************

With all this in mind, then, we may (finally) turn to the "content" of Chapter
Two.


Part 2:  "Content" Of Chapter Three

Korzybski states that his task is "to originate" a "general science of man
embracing _all_ his functions, languages, mathematics, science, and
'mental' ills included."  This science, he says, would be a General
Antrhopology which would include Anthropology(1933) as a subset, or
"Restricted Anthropology."  Studies in this field must use a "language of
four-dimensional structure."

SCIENCE AND SANITY continues this project, begun in MANHOOD OF HUMANITY,
which "defined man functionally as a time-binder."  Time-binding is impeded
when "doctrines or creeds. . . proclaim . . . that any progress or
departure from 'time-honored' habits. . . is a 'mortal sin' . . . "  This
can most effectively be done by "those who control our symbolism -- words,
money,."  This control can be very profitable for them.

This General Anthropology will not be possible "if we disregard s.r"

MANHOOD OF HUMANITY showed that "the canons of what we call 'civilization'
. . . are based on anamilistic generalizations taken from. . . the lives of
cows, horses, dogs, pigs., and applied to man."  Because these
generalizations were not based on scientific study of man, civilizations
based on these canons fail.

Korzybski wishes to help humans become "adult."  We "have not . . . emerged
from a very primitive stage of semantic development."  The structures of
existing languages have prevented the discovery of the specifically-human
about humanity; the language of the non-A system "point[s] the way toward
the means of control of a special therapeutic and preventitive character."

Korzybski observes that "the building of a non-A system in 1933 is an
extremely laborious enterprise. . . and . . . beyond the power of any
single man to complete."  It will require "something similar" to
Aristotle's formulation of "a whole scientific program."  This "something"
would not be a scientific program but "a system which . . . in structure,
is similar to the structure of the known facts from all branches of
science."  Korzybski recognizes that this means deep familiarity with "many
branches of science," and he has taken years to gain this famiilarity.

"The unexpected drama of such an enterprise is found, in that a
non-A-system, like its predecessors, involves full-fledged structural
metaphysics of some sort. . . a non-A system, to be of any semantic value
at all, must start with the structural metaphysics or structural
assumptions as given by science 1933."

Neurological evidence(1933) suggests taht "languages _may_ have structure,"
which "could not have been suggested by the A-system; nor could it have
been analyzed by A means."

"The most encouraging feature of this work is the fact that it is
_experimental_" and seems to work well in practice.  "All desireable human
characteristics, high 'mentality' included, have a definite
psychophysiological mechanism, easily understood and easily trained."
_Patient work_ is the key to this, like any training.

The problems of a non-A system are both scientific and practical.  The
results "help any individual to solve his problems by himself, to his own
and others' satisfaction."  The A-system led to "universal disagreement,"
up to and including wars.  (It is worth noting here that Korzybski does
_not_ claim that the non-A-system will necessarily prevent war.)

All human institutions, even war, depend upon speaking; thus General
Semantics covers a huge field.  SCIENCE AND SANITY is written "on the level
of the average intelligent reader."  Such a reader will find his "time"
amply repaid for studying and practicing GS formulations.

"This investigation has turned out to be a general introduction to sanity."

Teachers who do not teach according to the new system "do not honestly
perform their very serious social obligations."  Ignorance is no longer an
excuse.

"The present non-A-system is far from perfect," and must be updated,
expanded, etc., as increased scientific "knowledge" and increase practice
of non-A "thinking" may dictate/indicate/etc.

Korzybski acknowledges Spengler's DECLINE OF THE WEST as, apparently, a
significant predecessor.  Spengler's work is "frankly anthropological, in
the sense of General Anthropology."  It studies four-dimensional dynamic
structures.  Korzybski speculates that the era to follow Western
Civilization's decline may be the "adulthood of humanity."  He cites
several diplomats to underline the point that a major change is happening
(1933) in Western culture.

"I want to make clear only that words are _not_ the things spoken about,
and that there is _no_ such thign as an object in absolute isolation.
These assertions are negative and experimental, and cannot be successfully
denied by anyone, except by producing positive evidence, which is
impossible."

"_Structure, and structure alone_, is _the_ only link between languages and
the empirical world."

"Mathematics . . . seems to be _the only language_ ever produced by man
which, _in structure, is similar_, or the most similar known, to the
strcuture of the world _and of our nervous system. . . . in this
'similarity of structure' we find _the only_ positive 'knowledge' of 1933."

Korzybsky's work is "structural and analytical" as opposed to Spengler's
which was "intuitive and depictive."  Spengler failed to note that a
mathematics is a language, and that it is connected to the s.r of the
period in which it evolves.

Human s.r define a culture; changing s.r "quicken and transform one period
into the next one."

Korzybski has formulated "this most fundamental structural semantic
problem. . . for the first time."  "It will allow. . . the making of human
progress conscious," etc.



>Subject: Chapter 3 -- Part 3:  (Semantic) Reactions

3)  Personal (semantic) reactions to the Chapter

Some of what follows is very personal.  If you don't care for such things,
you have been warned.

On this, my third reading of Chapter Three, I found much of interest and
value to me.  Here, despite the structurally "unique" nature of SCIENCE AND
SANITY, Korzybski does indeed state many of his basic methodological
concerns (word not the thing, non-elementalism, etc.).

On the other hand, I found much of his rhetoric frustrating.  Count Alfred
"I offer no panacaeas" Korzybski tells us repeatedly that his methods will
"help any individuals to solve his problems" satisfactorily.  More than
this, he seems at times to see himself, or his book, as the herald of a
"new era," that the result of the application of GS will be "momentous,"
that "the dreams of Leibnitz will become sober reality."  Honestly,
"panacaea" is too _weak_ a word for what Korzybski seems to think of GS;
the Parousia would seem to be a more apt term.  However, this is nothing but 
creebing on my part, which is not terribly profitable.

I deliberately quoted Korzybski's statement that "a non-A-system. . .
involves full-fledged structural metaphysics of some sort," in the hope of
shutting down once and for all the "circle of metaphysics" arguments, at
least from those with (exaggerated?) respect for Korzybski's evaluations/
formulations.  I freely admit, however, that *I* was in error in my own
evaluation of Korzybski's attitude toward metaphysics; the (rather shrill)
remarks of his followers when confronted with the word had created in me a
false "assumption" (s.r) on the subject, which had not yet fallen to the
pressure of facts.

It is clear that in this (as in much else) Korzybski _did his homework_,
and had some idea what metaphysics actually studies -- as opposed to those
who seem to get their definition of the word from the "metaphysics" section
of chain bookshops, where th eword is wrenched from its historical context
and made to describe books on astrology, angelology, palmistry, and other
antiscientific eyewash.  Metaphysics is not _anti-science_; it is the
complement of science, the attempt to think clearly about those areas of
experience that science cannot legitimately discuss.

General Semantics, _as_ a scientific endeavor, attempts to push the
boundary of what science can legitimately discuss as far as possible.  This
is a proper goal for any scientific endeavor.  Korzybski's formulation of
General Semantics, furthermore, does not attempt to outlaw discussion of
what _science_ cannot discuss:  thus avoiding the error Wittgenstein made
in his seventh proposition.  (I fear that some modern GS-practitioners,
failing to learn from Korzybski's example, have fallen back into
Wittgenstein's error.)

None of which is to fall into Korzybski worship myself!

********************************************************************************

"Such a definite General Anthropology. . . would include all disciplines of
human interest from a special anthropological and semantic point of view."
This statement interests me greatly, particularly when placed beside
General Semantics's broad concern with _structure_.  It seems to me that a
strongly _parallel_ "intellectual movement" to GS, very much fitting
Korzybski's description of General Anthropology, has grown up at, roughly,
the "same" time as General Semantics -- primarily, but not exclusively, in
Europe.  I refer to structuralism, semiotics, etc.  This movement (or group
of movements, etc.) may be said to have its roots in Ferdinand de Saussure,
a rough contemporary of Korzybski, and his _course de linguistique
generale_, which I recommend highly.

Is anyone else on this list familiar with "structualism,"
"post-structuralism," etc.?  If so, do you see the same kind of parallel
and complementary relationship I do?

********************************************************************************

I find Korzybski's outright hostility to organized religion (see p.40)
somewhat irritating, but agree with his point that fanaticism --
specifically, religious "authorities" attempting to exercise control in
inappropriate ways -- has led to delayed development in _some_ cultures.
Korzybski's discussion of this matter falls into "allness," however ("we
always find"), and, though he softens it ("among other reasons"), I suspect
that any really rigorous investigation would show taht, in some cultures,
these "other reasons" more than adequately explain what Korzybski describes
as a failure to "progress" beyond the "primitive" stages of culture -- a
statement as culturally/ethnologically purblind, from the perspective of
1995, as his references regarding race.  As has been observed, however,
this peculiarly offensive tendency to cultural chauvinism in Korzybski's
writing can be more than adequately explained by reference to his own time
and culture.  Western culture(1933) seemed enlightened by 1933 standards; by
the standards of American culture(1995), it seems bigoted and, indeed,
primitive in its insularity.

********************************************************************************

Korzyubski's statements (pp43-4) regarding the breadth and depth of
knowledge required for the production of his work seem vain and
self-serving from the point of view of a casual or first-time reader -- at
least, that is how they appeared to me on first reading S&S.  It is only
with familiarity that one becomes aware of just how much of the science,
mathematics, history, linguistics, anthropology, etc., of ca.1933 Korzybski
had truly absorbed and kept at his command; and my reaction, at any rate,
to this realization is a kind of awe, and understanding (though not
agreement) with the Korzybski-olators one occasionally encounters.

At this point, I am beginning to have a sense of a character behind the
book.  It may or may not have anything to do with Korzybski's real
personality, but I find myself seeing  a strange combination:  a sort of
innocent vanity, as of the man who truly believes that he has discovered
what humanity has needed all this time; mixed with a naive humility, an
almost pathetic awareness of his own limitations and those of his work.
The clumsy and portentious writing of SCIENCE AND SANITY, finally, leave me
with the impression that this humorless book was written only by suppresing
a tremendous, bubbly sense of humor.  (This is probably the most "personal"
reaction in this posting.)

On my first, and even my second readings, Chapter Three seemed to wander
aimlessly from topic to topic.  Only now, with my third (and much more
dipping in here and there to write these posts), do I begin to see a
pattern to the thing -- a pattern reflected in the book as a whole, as
discussed in the first of these notes.

And here I stpo, having made my comments and, I hope, indicated some
interesting areas for discussion.



>Subject: Chapter 3 -- Part 4:  Semantic Nitpicking

4)  Semantic nit picking.

I've commented in the past that I think Korzybski was not a very good writer.
I have also observed that his writing does not very well follow his own
principles.  

I observe that he earnestly uses a number of classical rhetorical devices 
intended to compel the reader to agree with the writer without really thinking 
the matter through.  These range from the overuse of words and phrases like 
"obviously" and "it is clear" to appeals to the reader's ego -- S&S is written 
"on the level of the average intelligent reader, and any such reader will get 
the full benefit for his labour provided he is willing to put into it the 
necessary work and persxistence." (46)  All these devices are _legitimate_, 
but the concentration of them in S&S becomes obtrusive and so they tend to 
defeat their own purpose.

********************************************************************************

WRT the formulation "The word is not the thing," I am interested that
Korzybski's formal formulation is slightly different -- "Words are not the
things spoken about."  This strikes me as a significant difference, and I
offer a puzzle to explain why:

Consider the sentence,

	I use the word dog to refer to animals like Lassie,
	Rin-tin-tin, Spot, Fido, Bowser, Rex, etc.

If Lassie, Rin-tin-tin, etc., are familiar to the listener, or are
available for pointing-at, this is, I imagine, a reasonably good example of
extensional definition.

Now, this sentence is largely about the word 'dog.'  It also _uses_ the
word 'dog.'  Now, in this sentence, is the word 'dog' the thing 'the word
"dog?"'

********************************************************************************

Korzybski claims that the non-A-system of S&S is built "on negative
premises."  His premises seem to be the formulatiosn given in the first
full paragraph on p.50 -- "words are _not_ the things spoken about" and
"there is _no_ such thing as an object in absolute isolation."

I suggest that the latter, at least, is _not_ a negative premise.  It
seems, rather, to be the negative formulation of the following _positive_
premise:  "Any object that exists, has some relationship to some other
object or objects."  I note that this postive premise has a definite
"all-ness" component to it.  

Is there any significant difference between the implications of these two
formulations?  Can Korzybski's first premise be restated as a positive in a
similar way?

********************************************************************************

I append here a short list of quotations, frankly wrenched from context.  I ask
interested persons to evaluate these quotations in terms of GS principles
-- especially in terms of non-"allness" and non-identity/identification.
As my own understanding of these principles is still in the formative
phases, I imagine that some, and possibly all of them, will prove to be
semantically hygenic after all; but I offer them for comment.  Warning;
again, this will probably seem like nit-picking to some.


". . . a scientific revision of all our notions about ourselves is needed."
(38)

Religious leaders, etc., "are unfit to be anyu longer entrusted with the
care of the further development of culture and the future of mankind."
(40)  Identification?

"The present work . . .  turned out to be the 'Adulthood of Humanity'" (41)
Identification?  

The 'mentally' ill "always exhibit some infantile symptoms." (41)  Always?
And who gets to define maturity?

"All statements . . . in this work are about empirical facts, language, and
its structure." (42)  Oh.  Really?  *All* of them?

". . . any thoughtful reader will understand it." (43)  _Any_ thoughtful
reader?  Even a thoughtful seven-year-old who has to "sound out" most of the
words?

". . . all desirable human characteristics . . . have a definite
psychophysiological mechanism." (45)  Again, I wonder if he had a
comprehensive list of "all" desirable human characteristics (I'd love to
see that list!), and if he had personally verified that "all" of them have
such a mechanism.

"The results. . . help any individual."  (45)

". . . the only content of knowledge is structural."  (47)

". . . it is an entirely justified observation. . . " (48)

"Spengler is a mathematician" (48)

". . . in this 'similarity of structure' we find _the only_ positive
knowledge' of 1933.'" (51)


--dan'l

 ==========================================================================