>Date: Sun, 3 Dec 1995 14:23:14 -0600 >To: ssread-l@newciv.org >Subject: Summary of chapter seven This message come really from Dan'l, who summarized the chapter and gave it to me to post today. So, read on. A most interesting set of comments, yes? -c *** Let's cut to the chase here. I'll come back and summarize the rest of the chapter, but first and most important: on pp.92-4, Korzybski offers, possibly, the single most succinct summary of g-s principles to be found anywhere in S&S. These may be classified as _rejections_, _acceptances_, and _introductions._ REJECTIONS: 1) The postulate of uniqueness of subject-predicate representation. [Dan'l asks: What does this mean?] 2) The two-valued elementalistic 'logic' as expressed in the law of 'excluded third.' 3) The necessary confusion through the lack of discrimination between the 'is' of identity, which Korzybski rejects completely (he adds later: "because identity is never found in this world"), and the 'is' of predication, the 'is' of existence, and the 'is' used as an auxiliary verb. (H'mmmmm. . . Based on my earlier post to Richard F. on "is" and "have," it sounds as if old K. were ahead of me again on this one.) 4) The elementalism, as exemplified by the assumed sharp division of 'senses' _and_ 'mind', 'percept' _and_ 'concept, 'emotions' _and_ 'intellect'. 5) The elementalistic theory of 'meaning'. 6) The elementalistic postulate of two-valued 'cause-effect'. 7) The elementalistic theory of definitions, which disregards the undefined terms. 8) The three-dimensional theory of propositions and language. [Dan'l also asks what this one means.] 9) The assumption of the cosmic validity of grammar. 10) The preference for intensional methods. 11) The additive and elementalistic definition of 'man'. ACCEPTANCES: 1) Negative, 'is-not' premises which cannot be denied without the production of "impossible" data. 'Difference,' 'differentiation,' etc., as fundamental. 2) Relations, structure, and order as fundamental. 3) Many-valued, more general, structurally more correct 'logic of probability' of /Lukasiewicz and Tarski -- this becomes an infinite-valued semantics. 4) Functional representation wherever possible. 5) The absolute individuality of events on the un-speakable object levels. 6) 'Logical existence' as fundamental. 7) The propositional function of Russell; the doctrinal function of Keyser; a generalized system-function as after Sheffer. 8) Infinite-valued determinism of maximum probability 9) Extensional methods INTRODUCTIONS: 1) Principle of non-elementalism, leading to: a) non-elementalistic theory of meaningS b) non-elementalistic theory of definitions based on undefined terms c) Psycho-physiological theory of semantic reactions 2) General principle of uncertainty in all statements 3) Differential and four-dimensional models 4) Four-dimensional theory of propositions and language [Once again, Dan'l inquires what this means. . . ] 5) Psychophysiological considerations of non-elementalistic orders of abstractions 6) Infinite-valued causality 7) New punctuation indicating "etc." 8) Non-elementalistic, functional definition of "man". * * * * * Okay, back to the beginning of Chapter 7. [p.85] K. leads in with a number of quotations -- mostly from mathematicians and mathematical philosophers -- which generally point up some of the Aristotelian/elementalistic matters K will reject on pp.92-4 [p.86] Korzybski says that the scientific "revolution" started in geometry. [Dan'l adds: half true; relativity has its roots in geometry, but quantum theory began elsewhere.] Gauss, Lobachevski, Riemann, etc., displaced Euclid's geometry as "the" geometry. [Again, half-right. Non-Euclidean geometries had been developed before these folks, but had been discarded. In fact, the usual reason for developing them was to find some point at which they were self- contradictory and so to 'prove' the parallel postulate -- which, of course, never happened.] With relativity and quantum theory, it becomes impossible to speak meaningfully of "the" universe, that is, a single, objectively identical- with-itself-to-all-observers Universe. Korzybski seems to imply that his own work has done likewise for "man" -- replaced the concept of "the" man with a concept of "a" man. He sees in all these "revolutions" a change from "the" to "a." Korzybski proceeds to praise Aristotle as "a most gifted man," whose work has "semantically affected perhaps the largest number of people ever influenced by a single man." Hence, his name stands as Korzybski's emblem for th e"old" body of doctrines. The study of this body of doctrines "may help us to undertand ourselves." [p.87] K- gives a brief, interpretive biography of Aristotle, Plato's pupil who rejected Plato's mathematical philosophy in favor of a biological philosophy. Aristotle's extraversion & Plato's introversion stand as examples of "two _extreme_ tendencies." We(1933) know that either extreme is unsound. Extreme extraversion leads to gross elementalistic empiricism and paranoia; extreme introversion, to elementalistic idealsm and schizophrenia; neither is a healthy, scientific orientation; both result in the building of fictitious worlds. [p.88] "Normal" people act on facts rather than beliefs. An introvert, at least, "thinks," and so is easier to re-train. Aristotle's doctrines tend to appeal to extraverts, who "think" only "feebly." Aristotle identified words with things, so the structure of "primitive" language became the structure of the A-world. We inherit this language and structure, but language should reflect the structure of the world, not vice-versa. [p.89] K- compares a natural green leaf to an artifical one to which green coloring has been added. He claims that "in savage mythologies, there were always demons in _human_ shape who actually made everything with their hands." [Dan'l thinks this indicates that K- actually knew very little about mythology. . . ] This mythology gives the world a 'plus' structure reflected in the subject-predicate form. [I *THINK* that he is attempting to say something like: "The subject-predicate form elementalistically considers characteristics as something added-to a generic 'subject,'" but how he derives this from mythology escapes me utterly. I also disagree with the premise, but that is another issue. . .] This structure is anthropomorphic [In what way?] and "closely related to our 'senses', taken in a very elementalistic, primitive form." Even science has only escaped this tendency since Einstein. Aristotle could not have realized any of this because he took his language-structure for granted. We still mostly do this. [p.90] We associate Aristotle's name strongly with those of Euclid and Newton. [Newton? I'd think of Plato and Socrates. . . ] Followers have tried to patch the N-, E-, and A-systems; religious leaders have defended the A-system with threats of death. To revise A is very difficult even today(1933), partly because a system tends to self-repair and so must be completely rebuilt rather than patched. With E and N, the combined system has tremendous staying power. We habitually project the structure of out language onto the world. [p.91] Even when we criticize the A-system, we tend to use it, thus unconsciously reinforcing it. Einstein's chief achievement was in not dividing space-time into "space" and "time." We must do the same for the organism-as-a-whole. Non-E came first; then non-N; now the "time" is ripe for non-A. Non-E, non-N, and non-A share a single underlying structure and metaphysics. They are mutually interdependent. [Dan'l wonders if this might be partly an attempt on K-'s part to make his system look more important because Einstein/QM "interdepends" on it?] [p.92] Sciences have previously built non-A languages for their purposes. Abandonment of the "law of the excluded third, leads automatically to the non-chrysippian and non-A infinite-valued 'logics', which merge with the theory of probability." [I'm afraid that my handy dandy desk dictionary gives me not a clue aw to what "chyrysippian" might mean.] Modern science will be the 'metaphysics' of the non-A system. [here follows the list I moved to the top of the summary] [p.94] All science is developing in the non-A direciton. Human relations(1933) are still mostly based on the A-system-function. To build a 'science of man' K- must change to non-A terminology & methods. A, E, N systems have too many unjustified infinities; non-E, non-N, non-A system eliminates these. [p.95] Infinities arise due to faulty, insufficient observations. Because there is no general psycho-logical theory at present(1933), we study the structure and methods that have led to the greatest achievements of humanity & train our s.r to those methods & that structure. Therefore following chapters will survey many scientific achievements, at a level any intelligent reader can follow. [p.96] A new science must and will be established to continue non-A inquiry. Old, elementalistic terms must be used but are set off in 'quotation marks' to emphasize this. "All languages have some characteristics similar to mathematical languages." Most A nouns do not name a thing but a one-valued definition; objective processes are infinite-valued. All characteristics are due to structure. Most A problems may be solved by reformulating. [p.97] Non-A, non-E, non-N is more general than A,E,N. A,E,N is included as a particular case of non-A, non-E, non-N. Thus, non-A, non-E, non-N makes understanding A,E,N easier, while the reverse is not true. "Old heads" will tend to be sceptical and even abusive concerning the "new" system and its proponents. Learning non-A, non-E, non-N thinking can be attained only with difficulty because we must change habits. [p.98] "Intellect"/"emotion" are elementalistic, included in non-elementalistic "semantic reaction." The organism-as-a-whole is a dependable structural non-elementalistic generalization. ============================================================================ >Date: Sun, 3 Dec 1995 21:30:56 -0800 (PST) >From: Earl Hautala >To: ssread-l >Subject: a note or two on Ch. 7 Dan'l's asks some questions in his summary. > 1) The postulate of uniqueness of subject-predicate representation. [Dan'l asks: What does this mean?] I think that K wants to promote his idea about relationships extending beyond categories. To say "Fido is this dog" (while acceptable in terms of A logic) fails to fit Fido as-a-whole into an environment. After consideration one might say something about predicting the consequences of Fido continuing and not-continuing in this environment, as a function of probability. The subject-predicate structure of the Indo-European languages presents the language users with unique constructs as opposed to probable scenarios. Perhaps I can add a note gathered from one of my philosophy profs (many years ago) about one of Dan'l's statements: >p.89... [I *THINK* that he is attempting to say something like: "The subject-predicate form elementalistically considers characteristics as something added-to a generic 'subject,'" but how he derives this from mythology escapes me utterly. In Greek epistemology before the time of Aristotle, the universe consisted of gross formless substance (hyle = pronounced hoo-lay) which "strives" toward the perfection of the immaterial Forms. This scheme has no foundation in experience. One could call it a "myth." The Aristotelian version of epistemology involves metaphysics. We experience the manifestations of matter as it takes on some of the character imparted by the Forms. Green apples consist of the Apple-ness Form, the Green-ness Form, the Crisp-ness Form, etc. This strange state of matter-affected by Form deludes us. We believe that we experience change. [The substance of Fido attempts to reach the perfection of universal Dog-ness.] We only sense the action of matter affected by Form. We see attributes, the amalgum of substance-Form. To rid ourselves of these delusions, we must begin to understand everything as substance forever hidden from discovery by our senses, like a pincushion completely covered by overlapping pinheads of attributes or properties. The properties appear to change, but the corruptible "sub + stance" remains invisible. [Etymologically, sub (L.) refers to under and _stare_ refers to stand (which has all kinds of meanings). Substance becomes that which underlies or stands behind the appearances.] This constitutes a neat box no one can scrabble out of by argument or experiment. Crude substance has no sensible properties. We cannot sense the Forms because they do not consist of substance. We can only sense substance as affected by the Forms. Academics refer to this view as "substance-attribute" metaphysics. ------------ >p.92... [I'm afraid that my handy dandy desk dictionary gives me not a clue to what "chyrsippian" might mean.] Zeno founded the Stoic school of philosophy. It foundered on the rocks of Neo-Platonism around 260 BPE. Chrysippus reorganized and invigorated the school beginning 232. What we get from later sources goes like this. The later Stoics investigated grammar to find the "truth", found that qualities "are" real, occupy space, and that two things may occupy the same space at the same time, because matter consists of divine reason, motivated by Fate. (Collier's Encyc.) >From the later Stoics comes the notion of the _Summum Bonum_, the greatest good, _rational action_. [Later an English empiricist retorted: "There is no _Summum Bonum_ there is only the Summum Malum, which is death." (Hobbes?)] ----------------- K does have orthograpic and definition problems. [Jose may know the citations in "the book" better than I.] K changes from the spelled out verbal `infinities' (page95) to the figure 8 on-its-side version on page 96. I think he explains his intentions later on. This type of "apparent" contradition gives readers (new and experienced) some idea of the problems we generate using language to analyze language. --Earl ============================================================================ >Date: Fri, 15 Dec 95 13:40:33 GMT >To: gs >From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway) >Subject: Dan'l's questions on chapter 7 Summary: I answer Dan'l's questions about subject-predicate representation, and 3- and 4-dimensional language. In his summary of chapter 7 (which I seem to have deleted, but fortunately I found a print-out -- can anyone send me another copy?), Dan'l asked for clarification of several items in AK's lists of rejections, acceptances, and introductions: Rejecting "the postulate of uniqueness of subject-predicate representation". Rejecting "the three-dimensional theory of propositions and language". Introducing "the four-dimensional theory of propositions and language". Here's my idea of what AK means by these. The "uniqueness of subject-predicate representation" refers to the aristotelian tenet that all indicative sentences have the subject-predicate form: they attribute a property (the predicate) to an entity (the subject). AK rejects this in favour of more general notions of sentences expressing relations among several entities, and quantification over variables, as has been (1933, and since) adopted by mathematical logic. The subject-predicate form is a special case, where there is only a single entity. Attempts to shoehorn all actual sentences into s-p form, by declaring the initial noun phrase to be the subject and all of the rest of the sentence -- verb, object, indirect object, quantifiers, etc. -- to be the predicate does not fit the structure of even the ordinary language of Aristotle's time. AK's use of the formulations "three-dimensional" and "four-dimensional" is a verbal shorthand, referring respectively to space-split-from-time and spatio-temporal descriptions. Space has three dimensions, space-time has four, hence the names. "Three-dimensional" language illegitimately separates space from time. An entity called a "car" appears in such language to be a definite physical object which either does or does not exist at any given time, and is "the same" car at different times of its existence. This gives rises to conundrums such as whether it is the same car after replacing a component. Three-dimensional language is thus incapable of describing change without creating fictitious problems. "Four-dimensional" language is the language of space-time, in which one can express development, change, spatiotemporal structure. From this point of view, "this car" refers to a complex spatiotemporal structure of which we can distinguish a part of that structure which is its assembly in a factory, another part which is its eventual consignment to a scrap heap, and further parts which are the replacement of components, the processes of wear and tear, etc. "The car" is a label for the whole spatiotemporal structure, and the question of whether "the car today" is the same as "the car tomorrow" can be seen to be nonsensical, as if one asked whether one end of a pencil is "the same as" the other end. BTW, I forget who mentioned a professor who set his students the question of whether a car with the radiator cap changed is the same car. How would that professor mark my discussion above? I have heard that there is a saying among those who maintain historic wooden vessels: "After a hundred years you have either a replica or a wreck." ___ \X/ Richard Kennaway, jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk, http://www.sys.uea.ac.uk/~jrk/ School of Information Systems, University of East Anglia ============================================================================ >Subject: Thanks to Richard. More on S-P form. More on 3/4 dimensional language. >To: ssread-l@newciv.org >Date: Mon, 18 Dec 95 11:44:21 PST >From: "Dan'l DanehyOakes" Some representations/formulations/etc. of my abstractions at about 11:00 AM on 18 Dec 95 in San Francisco, CA. Summary: I thank Richard K. for his answers and seek some further clarifications. Thank you for your answers, Richard! > The "uniqueness of subject-predicate representation" refers to the > aristotelian tenet that all indicative sentences have the subject-predicate > form: they attribute a property (the predicate) to an entity (the subject). I evaluate that my confusion of this one stems from a difference between how I use the word "predicate" and how K. and g-s'ers in general seem to use it. I quote from the AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, Second College Ed'n: predicate. . . n. 1. Gram. The part of a sentence or clause that expresses something about the subject, consisting of a verb and often including objects, modifiers, or complements of the verb. 2. Logic. Whatever is stated about the subject of a proposition. Now, I do not quote this to "prove" that the g-s usage "is wrong," but merely to adduce some evidence as to where my confusion arose. In 7th grade or so, I learned the first definition in my English-language class. Thus, for me, The grass is green would have subject-predicate form, but so would: The grass reflects light in certain wavelengths, or I evaluate the grass as green or Fido runs or even At 5:07 PM on Thursday, 21 Dec 95, Spot ran twenty meters down Brighton Way in Merrick, NY, and urinated on the green grass of Anne Gray's front lawn. In these grammar classes, I was taught that "predicate" referred to "the verb and everything after it." So I could not even imagine how you could write a grammatical English sentence that was *not* in subject-predicate form! I wonder if the use of this term causes other people similar confusion? A glance at Aristotle's "Prior Analytics" makes it clear that he *did* define a "proposition" in the way that this definition of "subject- predicate" implies. Specifically, he writes: "A premiss then is a sentence affirming or denying one thing of another." (This and other quotes from Aristotle come from the Tech Classics Archive, btw.) He goes on to say that these may be universal or particular, definite or indefinite, giving examples like: "Contraries are subjects of the same science" and "Pleasure is not good." Furthermore, he uses the term "predicate" in this way: "I call that a term into which the premiss is resolved, i.e. both the predicate and that of which it is predicated, ' being' being added and 'not being' removed, or vice versa." So I can see, looking at this, where the g-s concept of "subject-predicate form" arises. But I am not at all clear as to why g-s'ers (beginning with the ubiquitous K) use this *term*, when the more common meaning of the terms "subject" and "predicate" for most English speakers will cause them to become confused as I was? I also appreciate your clarification of "three-dimensional" and "four- dimensional" language. But I wonder whether the use of four-dimensional does not in some sense undermine, if not actually contradict, the principle underlying non-identity? For example, consider the ever-popular car. Let's leave out the change of a radiator cap for the moment; I agree (in principle) that a car, sitting on a driveway, not running, not being bashed by a sledgehammer, i.e., "doing nothing" in the ordinary sense -- *changes* from moment to moment. Various processes of decay (e.g., rusting, battery life, etc.) proceed at "all" "times". Thus, if we regard the car three-dimensionally, the car(noon) clearly is not the car(12:05 PM), if by "is" we mean "is identical with in all aspects, etc." But if we regard the car *four*-dimensionally, then we can see the car(noon) and the car(12:05 PM) as two "snapshots," crossections of the same spatio- temporal structure, whose processes were proceding before noon and will in all probability continue well beyond 12:05 PM. Thus, if we think of "the car" not as "the car right now" but rather as "the car in 'all' the various manifestations in which it becomes present to my consciousness between the first and last times I have contact with it," then it seems to me that the car(noon) and the car(12:05) *ARE* the same thing -- or, rather, are views of the same four-dimensional "object". The "error" arises from thinking of "the car right-now" as the object of discussion, rather than the spatio-temporal structure of "the car" as-a-whole. Indexing, I conceive, poses a big help in this. Instead of saying "the car has a blue paint job," it makes more sense to say "the car(today) has a blue paint job," allowing for the distinct possibility that this may not be true of the car through the extent of its spatio-temporal transistence (using Bal's term for "transitional existence"). (H'mmmmm. Bal, does this make us all transistors?) On the other hand, I think that commonsense often allows us to imply a lot of indexing without using it explicitly. For example, "This is a new car" clearly refers to the car(now) and not the car(several years down the road). However, even in a seemingly simple case like this, indexing can have value. I have owned two cars in my life, both bought new: an '82 Mazda GLC, and an '89 Sentra. I bought the Sentra when the Mazda went FORD (Found On Road Dead), and have ever since then thought of it as "the new car." I suddenly realized this morning that I've had the "new car" almost as long as I ever had the "old car!" Oy! Comments? --dan'l ============================================================================