>Date: Sun, 3 Dec 1995 14:23:14 -0600
>To: ssread-l@newciv.org
>Subject: Summary of chapter seven

This message come really from Dan'l, who summarized the chapter and gave it
to me to post today. So, read on. A most interesting set of comments, yes?
-c
***
Let's cut to the chase here.  I'll come back and summarize the rest of the
chapter, but first and most important:  on pp.92-4, Korzybski offers,
possibly, the single most succinct summary of g-s principles to be found
anywhere in S&S.  These may be classified as _rejections_, _acceptances_,
and _introductions._

REJECTIONS:

 1)     The postulate of uniqueness of subject-predicate representation.
                        [Dan'l asks:  What does this mean?]
 2)     The two-valued elementalistic 'logic' as expressed in the law
        of 'excluded third.'
 3)     The necessary confusion through the lack of discrimination between
        the 'is' of identity, which Korzybski rejects completely (he adds
        later: "because identity is never found in this world"), and the
        'is' of predication, the 'is' of existence, and the 'is' used as
        an auxiliary verb.  (H'mmmmm. . . Based on my earlier post to
        Richard F. on "is" and "have," it sounds as if old K. were ahead
        of me again on this one.)
 4)     The elementalism, as exemplified by the assumed sharp division of
        'senses' _and_ 'mind', 'percept' _and_ 'concept, 'emotions' _and_
        'intellect'.
 5)     The elementalistic theory of 'meaning'.
 6)     The elementalistic postulate of two-valued 'cause-effect'.
 7)     The elementalistic theory of definitions, which disregards the
        undefined terms.
 8)     The three-dimensional theory of propositions and language.
                        [Dan'l also asks what this one means.]
 9)     The assumption of the cosmic validity of grammar.
10)     The preference for intensional methods.
11)     The additive and elementalistic definition of 'man'.

ACCEPTANCES:

 1)     Negative, 'is-not' premises which cannot be denied without the
        production of "impossible" data.  'Difference,' 'differentiation,'
        etc., as fundamental.
 2)     Relations, structure, and order as fundamental.
 3)     Many-valued, more general, structurally more correct 'logic of
        probability' of /Lukasiewicz and Tarski -- this becomes an
        infinite-valued semantics.
 4)     Functional representation wherever possible.
 5)     The absolute individuality of events on the un-speakable object
        levels.
 6)     'Logical existence' as fundamental.
 7)     The propositional function of Russell; the doctrinal function of
        Keyser; a generalized system-function as after Sheffer.
 8)     Infinite-valued determinism of maximum probability
 9)     Extensional methods

INTRODUCTIONS:

 1)     Principle of non-elementalism, leading to:
                a) non-elementalistic theory of meaningS
                b) non-elementalistic theory of definitions based on
                   undefined terms
                c) Psycho-physiological theory of semantic reactions
 2)     General principle of uncertainty in all statements
 3)     Differential and four-dimensional models
 4)     Four-dimensional theory of propositions and language
                        [Once again, Dan'l inquires what this means. . . ]
 5)     Psychophysiological considerations of non-elementalistic
        orders of abstractions
 6)     Infinite-valued causality
 7)     New punctuation indicating "etc."
 8)     Non-elementalistic, functional definition of "man".

* * * * *

Okay, back to the beginning of Chapter 7.  [p.85] K. leads in with a number of
quotations -- mostly from mathematicians and mathematical philosophers -- which
generally point up some of the Aristotelian/elementalistic matters K will reject
on pp.92-4

[p.86]  Korzybski says that the scientific "revolution" started in geometry.
[Dan'l adds:  half true; relativity has its roots in geometry, but quantum
theory began elsewhere.]  Gauss, Lobachevski, Riemann, etc., displaced Euclid's
geometry as "the" geometry.  [Again, half-right.  Non-Euclidean geometries had
been developed before these folks, but had been discarded.  In fact, the usual
reason for developing them was to find some point at which they were self-
contradictory and so to 'prove' the parallel postulate -- which, of course,
never happened.] With relativity and quantum theory, it becomes impossible to
speak meaningfully of "the" universe, that is, a single, objectively identical-
with-itself-to-all-observers Universe.  Korzybski seems to imply that his own
work has done likewise for "man" -- replaced the concept of "the" man with a
concept of "a" man.  He sees in all these "revolutions" a change from "the" to
"a."  Korzybski proceeds to praise Aristotle as "a most gifted man," whose work
has "semantically affected perhaps the largest number of people ever influenced
by a single man."  Hence, his name stands as Korzybski's emblem for th e"old"
body of doctrines.  The study of this body of doctrines "may help us to
undertand ourselves."

[p.87] K- gives a brief, interpretive biography of Aristotle, Plato's pupil who
rejected Plato's mathematical philosophy in favor of a biological philosophy.
Aristotle's extraversion & Plato's introversion stand as examples of "two
_extreme_ tendencies."  We(1933) know that either extreme is unsound.  Extreme
extraversion leads to gross elementalistic empiricism and paranoia; extreme
introversion, to elementalistic idealsm and schizophrenia; neither is a
healthy, scientific orientation; both result in the building of fictitious
worlds.

[p.88]  "Normal" people act on facts rather than beliefs.  An introvert, at
least, "thinks," and so is easier to re-train.  Aristotle's doctrines tend to
appeal to extraverts, who "think" only "feebly."  Aristotle identified words
with things, so the structure of "primitive" language became the structure of
the A-world.  We inherit this language and structure, but language should
reflect the structure of the world, not vice-versa.

[p.89]  K- compares a natural green leaf to an artifical one to which green
coloring has been added.  He claims that "in savage mythologies, there were
always demons in _human_ shape who actually made everything with their hands."
[Dan'l thinks this indicates that K- actually knew very little about
mythology. . . ]  This mythology gives the world a 'plus' structure reflected
in the subject-predicate form.  [I *THINK* that he is attempting to say
something like:  "The subject-predicate form elementalistically considers
characteristics as something added-to a generic 'subject,'" but how he derives
this from mythology escapes me utterly.  I also disagree with the premise, but
that is another issue. . .] This structure is anthropomorphic [In what way?]
and "closely related to our 'senses', taken in a very elementalistic, primitive
form."  Even science has only escaped this tendency since Einstein.  Aristotle
could not have realized any of this because he took his language-structure for
granted.  We still mostly do this.

[p.90] We associate Aristotle's name strongly with those of Euclid and Newton.
[Newton?  I'd think of Plato and Socrates. . . ]  Followers have tried to patch
the N-, E-, and A-systems; religious leaders have defended the A-system with
threats of death.  To revise A is very difficult even today(1933), partly
because a system tends to self-repair and so must be completely rebuilt rather
than patched.  With E and N, the combined system has tremendous staying power.
We habitually project the structure of out language onto the world.

[p.91]  Even when we criticize the A-system, we tend to use it, thus
unconsciously reinforcing it.  Einstein's chief achievement was in not dividing
space-time into "space" and "time."  We must do the same for the
organism-as-a-whole.  Non-E came first; then non-N; now the "time" is ripe for
non-A.  Non-E, non-N, and non-A share a single underlying structure and
metaphysics.  They are mutually interdependent.  [Dan'l wonders if this might
be partly an attempt on K-'s part to make his system look more important
because Einstein/QM "interdepends" on it?]

[p.92]  Sciences have previously built non-A languages for their purposes.
Abandonment of the "law of the excluded third, leads automatically to the
non-chrysippian and non-A infinite-valued 'logics', which merge with the theory
of probability."  [I'm afraid that my handy dandy desk dictionary gives me not
a clue aw to what "chyrysippian" might mean.]  Modern science will be the
'metaphysics' of the non-A system.

[here follows the list I moved to the top of the summary]

[p.94] All science is developing in the non-A direciton.  Human relations(1933)
are still mostly based on the A-system-function. To build a 'science of man'
K- must change to non-A terminology & methods.  A, E, N systems have too many
unjustified infinities; non-E, non-N, non-A system eliminates these.

[p.95]  Infinities arise due to faulty, insufficient observations.  Because
there is no general psycho-logical theory at present(1933), we study the
structure and methods that have led to the greatest achievements of humanity &
train our s.r to those methods & that structure.  Therefore following chapters
will survey many scientific achievements, at a level any intelligent reader can
follow.

[p.96]  A new science must and will be established to continue non-A inquiry.
Old, elementalistic terms must be used but are set off in 'quotation marks' to
emphasize this.  "All languages have some characteristics similar to
mathematical languages."  Most A nouns do not name a thing but a one-valued
definition; objective processes are infinite-valued.  All characteristics are
due to structure.  Most A problems may be solved by reformulating.

[p.97]  Non-A, non-E, non-N is more general than A,E,N.  A,E,N is included as a
particular case of non-A, non-E, non-N.  Thus, non-A, non-E, non-N makes
understanding A,E,N easier, while the reverse is not true.  "Old heads" will
tend to be sceptical and even abusive concerning the "new" system and its
proponents.  Learning non-A, non-E, non-N thinking can be attained only with
difficulty because we must change habits.

[p.98]  "Intellect"/"emotion" are elementalistic, included in
non-elementalistic "semantic reaction."  The organism-as-a-whole is a
dependable structural non-elementalistic generalization.

 ============================================================================

>Date: Sun, 3 Dec 1995 21:30:56 -0800 (PST)
>From: Earl Hautala <eh@crl.com>
>To: ssread-l <ssread-l@newciv.org>
>Subject: a note or two on Ch. 7

Dan'l's asks some questions in his summary. 

> 1) The postulate of uniqueness of subject-predicate representation.
     [Dan'l asks:  What does this mean?]

I think that K wants to promote his idea about relationships 
extending beyond categories. To say "Fido is this dog" (while 
acceptable in terms of A logic) fails to fit Fido as-a-whole into an 
environment. After consideration one might say something about 
predicting the consequences of Fido continuing and not-continuing in 
this environment, as a function of probability. The 
subject-predicate structure of the Indo-European languages presents 
the language users with unique constructs as opposed to probable 
scenarios.

Perhaps I can add a note gathered from one of my  philosophy 
profs (many years ago) about one of Dan'l's statements:

>p.89... [I *THINK* that he is attempting to say something like:  
"The subject-predicate form elementalistically considers 
characteristics as something added-to a generic 'subject,'" but how 
he derives this from mythology escapes me utterly.

In Greek epistemology before the time of Aristotle, the universe 
consisted of gross formless substance (hyle = pronounced hoo-lay) which 
"strives" toward the perfection of the immaterial Forms. This scheme 
has no foundation in experience. One could call it a "myth." 

The Aristotelian version of epistemology involves metaphysics. We 
experience the manifestations of matter as it takes on some of the 
character imparted by the Forms. Green apples consist of the 
Apple-ness Form, the Green-ness Form, the Crisp-ness Form, etc. This 
strange state of matter-affected by Form deludes us. We believe that 
we experience change. [The substance of Fido attempts to reach the 
perfection of universal Dog-ness.] We only sense the action of 
matter affected by Form. We see attributes, the amalgum of 
substance-Form. To rid ourselves of these delusions, we must begin 
to understand everything as substance forever hidden from discovery 
by our senses, like a pincushion completely covered by overlapping 
pinheads of attributes or properties. The properties appear to 
change, but the corruptible "sub + stance" remains invisible.  
[Etymologically, sub (L.) refers to under and _stare_ refers to 
stand (which has all kinds of meanings). Substance becomes that 
which underlies or stands behind the appearances.]

This constitutes a neat box no one can scrabble out of by argument 
or experiment. Crude substance has no sensible properties. We 
cannot sense the Forms because they do not consist of substance. We 
can only sense substance as affected by the Forms. 

  Academics refer to this view as "substance-attribute" metaphysics. 

------------

>p.92... [I'm afraid that my handy dandy desk dictionary gives me 
not a clue to what "chyrsippian" might mean.]

Zeno founded the Stoic school of philosophy. It foundered on the 
rocks of Neo-Platonism around 260 BPE. Chrysippus reorganized and 
invigorated the school beginning 232. What we get from later sources 
goes like this. The later Stoics investigated grammar to find the 
"truth", found that qualities "are" real, occupy space, and that two 
things may occupy the same space at the same time, because matter 
consists of divine reason, motivated by Fate. (Collier's Encyc.)

>From the later Stoics comes the notion of the _Summum Bonum_, the 
greatest good, _rational action_. [Later an English empiricist 
retorted: "There is no _Summum Bonum_ there is only the Summum 
Malum, which is death." (Hobbes?)]
-----------------

K does have orthograpic and definition problems. [Jose may know the 
citations in "the book" better than I.] K changes from the spelled 
out verbal `infinities' (page95) to the figure 8 on-its-side version 
on page 96. I think he explains his intentions later on. This type 
of "apparent" contradition gives readers (new and experienced) some 
idea of the problems we generate using language to analyze language. 
--Earl

 ============================================================================

>Date: Fri, 15 Dec 95 13:40:33 GMT
>To: gs
>From: jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk (Richard Kennaway)
>Subject: Dan'l's questions on chapter 7

Summary: I answer Dan'l's questions about subject-predicate representation,
and 3- and 4-dimensional language.


In his summary of chapter 7 (which I seem to have deleted, but fortunately
I found a print-out -- can anyone send me another copy?), Dan'l asked for
clarification of several items in AK's lists of rejections, acceptances,
and introductions:

Rejecting "the postulate of uniqueness of subject-predicate representation".

Rejecting "the three-dimensional theory of propositions and language".

Introducing "the four-dimensional theory of propositions and language".

Here's my idea of what AK means by these.

The "uniqueness of subject-predicate representation" refers to the
aristotelian tenet that all indicative sentences have the subject-predicate
form: they attribute a property (the predicate) to an entity (the subject).
AK rejects this in favour of more general notions of sentences expressing
relations among several entities, and quantification over variables, as has
been (1933, and since) adopted by mathematical logic.  The
subject-predicate form is a special case, where there is only a single
entity.  Attempts to shoehorn all actual sentences into s-p form, by
declaring the initial noun phrase to be the subject and all of the rest of
the sentence -- verb, object, indirect object, quantifiers, etc. -- to be
the predicate does not fit the structure of even the ordinary language of
Aristotle's time.

AK's use of the formulations "three-dimensional" and "four-dimensional" is
a verbal shorthand, referring respectively to space-split-from-time and
spatio-temporal descriptions.  Space has three dimensions, space-time has
four, hence the names.

"Three-dimensional" language illegitimately separates space from time.  An
entity called a "car" appears in such language to be a definite physical
object which either does or does not exist at any given time, and is "the
same" car at different times of its existence.  This gives rises to
conundrums such as whether it is the same car after replacing a component.
Three-dimensional language is thus incapable of describing change without
creating fictitious problems.

"Four-dimensional" language is the language of space-time, in which one can
express development, change, spatiotemporal structure.  From this point of
view, "this car" refers to a complex spatiotemporal structure of which we
can distinguish a part of that structure which is its assembly in a
factory, another part which is its eventual consignment to a scrap heap,
and further parts which are the replacement of components, the processes of
wear and tear, etc.  "The car" is a label for the whole spatiotemporal
structure, and the question of whether "the car today" is the same as "the
car tomorrow" can be seen to be nonsensical, as if one asked whether one
end of a pencil is "the same as" the other end.

BTW, I forget who mentioned a professor who set his students the question
of whether a car with the radiator cap changed is the same car.  How would
that professor mark my discussion above?

I have heard that there is a saying among those who maintain historic
wooden vessels: "After a hundred years you have either a replica or a
wreck."

___
\X/ Richard Kennaway, jrk@sys.uea.ac.uk, http://www.sys.uea.ac.uk/~jrk/
    School of Information Systems, University of East Anglia

 ============================================================================

>Subject: Thanks to Richard.  More on S-P form.  More on 3/4 dimensional language.
>To: ssread-l@newciv.org
>Date: Mon, 18 Dec 95 11:44:21 PST
>From: "Dan'l DanehyOakes" <djdaneh@pbhyc.PacBell.COM>

Some representations/formulations/etc. of my abstractions at about 11:00
AM on 18 Dec 95 in San Francisco, CA.

Summary:  I thank Richard K. for his answers and seek some further
clarifications.

Thank you for your answers, Richard!


> The "uniqueness of subject-predicate representation" refers to the
> aristotelian tenet that all indicative sentences have the subject-predicate
> form: they attribute a property (the predicate) to an entity (the subject).

I evaluate that my confusion of this one stems from a difference between how
I use the word "predicate" and how K. and g-s'ers in general seem to use it.
I quote from the AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY, Second College Ed'n:

	predicate. . . n.  1. Gram. The part of a sentence or clause that
	expresses something about the subject, consisting of a verb and often
	including objects, modifiers, or complements of the verb.  2. Logic.
	Whatever is stated about the subject of a proposition.

Now, I do not quote this to "prove" that the g-s usage "is wrong," but merely
to adduce some evidence as to where my confusion arose.  In 7th grade or so,
I learned the first definition in my English-language class.  Thus, for me,

	The grass is green

would have subject-predicate form, but so would:

	The grass reflects light in certain wavelengths,

or

	I evaluate the grass as green

or 

	Fido runs

or even

	At 5:07 PM on Thursday, 21 Dec 95, Spot ran twenty meters down
	Brighton Way in Merrick, NY, and urinated on the green grass of
	Anne Gray's front lawn.

In these grammar classes, I was taught that "predicate" referred to "the
verb and everything after it." So I could not even imagine how you could 
write a grammatical English sentence that was *not* in subject-predicate 
form!

I wonder if the use of this term causes other people similar confusion?  

A glance at Aristotle's "Prior Analytics" makes it clear that he *did* 
define a "proposition" in the way that this definition of "subject-
predicate" implies.  Specifically, he writes:   "A premiss then is a 
sentence affirming or denying one thing of another."  (This and other
quotes from Aristotle come from the Tech Classics Archive, btw.)  He
goes on to say that these may be universal or particular, definite
or indefinite, giving examples like: "Contraries are subjects of the
same science" and "Pleasure is not good."  Furthermore, he uses the term 
"predicate" in this way:   "I call that a term into which the premiss 
is resolved, i.e. both the predicate and that of which it is predicated, '
being' being added and 'not being' removed, or vice versa."

So I can see, looking at this, where the g-s concept of "subject-predicate
form" arises.  But I am not at all clear as to why g-s'ers (beginning with
the ubiquitous K) use this *term*, when the more common meaning of the terms
"subject" and "predicate" for most English speakers will cause them to
become confused as I was?


I also appreciate your clarification of "three-dimensional" and "four-
dimensional" language.  But I wonder whether the use of four-dimensional does 
not in some sense undermine, if not actually contradict, the principle
underlying non-identity?

For example, consider the ever-popular car.  Let's leave out the change of a
radiator cap for the moment; I agree (in principle) that a car, sitting on
a driveway, not running, not being bashed by a sledgehammer, i.e., "doing
nothing" in the ordinary sense -- *changes* from moment to moment.  Various
processes of decay (e.g., rusting, battery life, etc.) proceed at "all" 
"times".

Thus, if we regard the car three-dimensionally, the car(noon) clearly is not
the car(12:05 PM), if by "is" we mean "is identical with in all aspects, etc."

But if we regard the car *four*-dimensionally, then we can see the car(noon)
and the car(12:05 PM) as two "snapshots," crossections of the same spatio-
temporal structure, whose processes were proceding before noon and will in 
all probability continue well beyond 12:05 PM.  

Thus, if we think of "the car" not as "the car right now" but rather as "the 
car in 'all' the various manifestations in which it becomes present to my 
consciousness between the first and last times I have contact with it," then it 
seems to me that the car(noon) and the car(12:05) *ARE* the same thing -- or, 
rather, are views of the same four-dimensional "object".

The "error" arises from thinking of "the car right-now" as the object of
discussion, rather than the spatio-temporal structure of "the car" as-a-whole.

Indexing, I conceive, poses a big help in this.  Instead of saying "the car
has a blue paint job," it makes more sense to say "the car(today) has a blue
paint job," allowing for the distinct possibility that this may not be true
of the car through the extent of its spatio-temporal transistence (using Bal's
term for "transitional existence").  (H'mmmmm.  Bal, does this make us all
transistors?)

On the other hand, I think that commonsense often allows us to imply a lot
of indexing without using it explicitly.  For example, "This is a new car"
clearly refers to the car(now) and not the car(several years down the road).

However, even in a seemingly simple case like this, indexing can have value.
I have owned two cars in my life, both bought new:  an '82 Mazda GLC, and an
'89 Sentra.  I bought the Sentra when the Mazda went FORD (Found On Road Dead),
and have ever since then thought of it as "the new car."  I suddenly realized
this morning that I've had the "new car" almost as long as I ever had the "old 
car!"  Oy!

Comments?

--dan'l

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