I am not very familiar with the "Integral Theory" memeplex, however I have begun to observe and contemplate it. In particular my mind is contemplating the epistemological issue of...

How do Integral theory and naïve realism relate?

This question can be disected into two questions:

• How does Integral theory recognise (i.e. understand, describe, represent and assimilate) the phenomenon of naïve realism, either directly or indirectly via related phenomena?

• How is Integral theory influenced at an epistemological level by naïve realism?

If anyone has any comments, links etc regarding these questions and potential answers, then please let me know via facebook or twitter or email.

Regarding the second question,

The following quote from "An approach to critiques of integral theory" points to an area in which the influence of naïve realism may potentially be found within integral theory.

"Theory and metatheory take data and theory, respectively, as their object. One must build arguments based on those objects for the validity of theories and metatheories. It is always possible to critique a theorist's data, their injunctions for generating it, their interpretation of it, etc. Wilber's case is no different. The objects of his theorizing and metatheorizing are open to criticism and some may turn out to be invalid or weak, in which case we have to consider whether Wilber's theoretical constructs based on those objects are invalidated or weakened in turn. It does not automatically follow that this would be the case. A theory is not inexorably dependent upon the validity of every data point in its view. But problems of this kind also can't be dismissed out of hand."

If naïve realism is operating at a deep epistemological level within the Integral memeplex, then this will show up as a pervasive, subtle distorting influence on interpretations, distinctions and categorisations that determine the objects (data, theory) upon which the memeplex stands.

One probing question would be... To what extent are the various conceptual objects treated as symbolic representations of ideas that in some way relate to 'something' that is alleged to exist in some manner, and to what extent are they imagined to have objective existence separate from the categories that we use to define/create them?

"What counts as an object, what counts as reality is a function of the system of representation we bring to bare on reality, namely language. So the world doesn't come to us all sliced up into objects and experiences. What counts as "this object" or "the same object" or as "a book" or "a table" or "a glass", that is a matter of the categories that we impose on the world and those are linguistic." (John Searle)

What is the difference between a naïve realist and non-naïve realist epistemological foundation?

I will give an example from physics. Ones beliefs regarding the nature of observables influences all interpretations of data and thereby the entire theory. I will describe a naïve realist belief regarding observables first and then a non-naïve realist one to indicate the difference.

Classical physics is naïve realist and this shows up in beliefs such as that the observable properties of a system are embodied by the system. For example, it was assumed that a particle had a perfectly defined position and momentum at all times, thus one merely needed better equipment to measure these to greater accuracy.

Quantum physics is non-naïve realist and this shows up in beliefs such as that the observable properties of a system are produced during the act of observation.

“We have no satisfactory reason for ascribing objective existence to physical quantities as distinguished from the numbers obtained when we make the measurements which we correlate with them. There is no real reason for supposing that a particle has at every moment a definite, but unknown, position which may be revealed by a measurement of the right kind... On the contrary, we get into a maze of contradiction as soon as we inject into quantum mechanics such concepts as carried over from the language and philosophy of our ancestors. . . It would be more exact if we spoke of ‘making measurements’ of this, that, or the other type instead of saying that we measure this, that, or the other ‘physical quantity’.” (E. C. Kemble)

The Heisenberg uncertainty principle describes the fact that a quantum system simply does not encode enough information to produce all observables at the same time. Thus for what are called complementary observables, the act of observing one observable to greater accuracy will erase information regarding the other. This is clearly illustrated by the Stern-Gerlach experiment.

For dicussion and proof re: the Stern Gerlach experiment see the relevant sections in this ebook “System Science of Virtual Reality”

For hints re: the consequences of quantum principles on the broader theoretical framework of science and mass culture see the article “Signs of an Emerging Paradigm Shift”.

What are the fundamental axioms and conceptual objects postualted by Integral theory?

How are they conceptualised, integrated and used within both the theory and metatheory? Where should I look to learn more about this specifically???

If there was a complete ontological specification of Integral theory, then the part that I am asking about is the upper level ontology.

Some information has come in – thank you :)

• Ontodynamics Not specifically about Wilberian Integral theory, but about integral theories in general. Here is a quote from it about Wilberian Integral theory...

“The mono-linear representation, which is standard in most esoteric teachings, as well as with more recent thinkers like Edward Haskell (Unified Science) and Ken Wilber (Integral theory), suffers from a certain inflexibility, because it assumes that every progression or ascent in consciousness will pass through the exact same series of stages, and the accounts that people give of their experiences with various non-ordinary states of consciousness paint a far more complex picture than this. Moreover, if there is only a single "spectrum of being", it is impossible to correlate the different esoteric teachings, because there will always be things that don't match up. Hence, the situation is, as always, more complex then the conventional representation takes it to be.” (Ontodynamics)

Is this true? Does Wilberian Integral theory propose “only a single spectrum of being”?

• Integral Ontology: The Logical Anatomization of Spirit by Henry Augustine

“The notion of Spirit is perhaps the core of Integral philosophy, which integrally separates it, so to speak, from the Pre-Socratic, Socratic, Medieval, Renaissance, Modern, 19th Century (in some respects), and Postmodern philosophic traditions alike. Therefore, it is important to explain and justify Spirit and Its Actuality in order to establish a firm logical foundation on which Integral can stand and from which it can be credited and acknowledged by the Postmodern tradition, which still dominates the conventional Western philosophic community.”

So 'spirit' is a core conceptual object within Integral theory. Is it perhaps 'The' core object upon which all other conceptual objects supervene?

If not, what other core objects are there? For example, does integral theory rely on 'God', 'matter', 'mind', 'space', 'time', 'object', 'process', etc as core concepts or are these derivates that emerge later?